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NOTE
The School As Publisher: Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier
For four decades, the United States Supreme Court has grappled with the
proper balance between students' first amendment1 rights and public school offi-
cials' authority to regulate their campuses and curricula.2 In the 1969 landmark
decision Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District3 the
Court announced that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to free-
dom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,"'4 and determined that the
first amendment offered substantial protection for student speech.5 In the two
decades since Tinker, courts have scrutinized any speech regulation by school
officials to ensure that they adequately observed these constitutional safeguards. 6
Over time, this accommodation of student rights proved to be uncomforta-
ble, sometimes leaving school officials with insufficient tools to perform their
function of inculcating community values and decent behavior.7 In Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier8 the Court permitted greater official control over
speech whenever a school sponsors the mode of expression. 9 When the school
organizes the communicative activity and provides for its production as part of
1. U.S. CoNST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press .... ). The first amendment is made binding on the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment. Eg., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 171 (1972).
2. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (compelling school
children to salute the flag violates first amendment); see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107
(1968) (state's right to prescribe curriculum does not include right to prohibit teaching of evolution).
3. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
4. Id. at 506.
5. Id. at 511. "In the absence of a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate
their speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their views." Id. Regulation of stu-
dent speech is constitutionally permissible only when conduct "materially disrupts classwork or in-
volves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others." Id. at 513.
6. E.g., Reineke v. Cobb County School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (en-
joining school censorship of student newspaper); Frasca v. Andrews, 463 F. Supp. 1043, 1048-49
(E.D.N.Y. 1979) (allowing censorship of student newspaper because of likelihood of disruption and
invasion of rights); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164, 1165 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (enjoining restraint
on distribution of student newspaper), aff'd without opinion, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975); Antonelli
v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D. Mass. 1970) (declaring unconstitutional a college presi-
dent's refusal to release student fees to finance campus newspaper); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp.
102, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (barring school officials from prohibiting publication of anti-Vietnam War
advertisement in school paper). See generally, Note, Administrative Regulation of the High School
Press, 83 MICH. L. REv. 625, 652-56 (1984) (proposes regulatory scheme for high school publica-
tions based on Tinker standards).
7. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681-86 (1986). For a discussion of
Fraser, see infra text accompanying notes 52-59.
Justice Black predicted that the protections the Court had placed on student speech would lead
to unhappy results. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 525 (Black, J., dissenting). "This case... subjects all the
public schools in the country to the whims and caprices of their loudest-mouthed, but maybe not
their brightest, students." Id. (Black, J., dissenting).
8. 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
9. Id. at 570-71.
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the school's general educational mission, the school will be treated as pub-
lisher,10 with much the same control over content as private publishers enjoy. 1
This Note traces the Court's articulation of students' freedom of expression
over the past twenty years. It examines the standards by which courts must
judge a school's control over student speech, and how these standards vary de-
pending on the school's relation to the expressive activity. The Note concludes
with a forecast that as a result of Kuhlmeier fewer views and voices will be heard
on campus as school publishers invoke their broad powers to stifle student
expression.
Robert Reynolds, the principal of Hazelwood East High School, objected to
two student-written articles scheduled for publication in the May 13, 1983, edi-
tion of the school-sponsored newspaper, Spectrum.12 One story described three
students' experiences with pregnancy.1 3 Reynolds believed that the students
could be readily identified, even though the story gave them fictitious names, 14
and that the article's references to sexual activity and birth control practices
were inappropriate for younger readers.15 The second story contained a named
student's critical remarks about his parents' marriage, parenting, and subsequent
divorce, and Reynolds was concerned that the student's parents had no opportu-
nity to respond or consent to the comments. 16 Reynolds deleted two pages con-
taining the stories from the edition, thereby eliminating several other stories to
which he had no objection.
1 7
Three student staff members filed suit against the school district, seeking a
declaration that their first amendment rights had been violated, injunctive relief,
and monetary damages. 18 The district court denied relief, finding no first amend-
ment violation. 19 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed, concluding that the censorship was unjustified because the principal
could not have reasonably forecast a disruption in classwork, substantial disor-
der, or the invasion of the rights of others.20 The Supreme Court reversed, hold-
10. Id. at 570.
11. Private publishers have complete control over what they publish. See Miami Herald Pub-
lishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 255-56 (1974) ("right of reply" statute granting political candi-
dates the right to equal space to answer criticisms by a newspaper held unconstitutional). A school
publisher can control speech only for legitimate reasons. See infra text accompanying notes 93-98.
12. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 565.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 565-66.
16. Id. at 566. Reynolds was unaware that the student's name already had been deleted by the
faculty advisor. Id.
17. Id. at 566 & n.1. Reynolds believed the printing deadline would not permit revision of the
articles in time to publish the newspaper before the school year ended. Id. at 566. He concluded
that his only options were to delete the two pages or publish no newspaper at all. Id. The other
articles on the pages dealt with teenage marriage, runaways, and juvenile delinquents, and one cov-
ered teenage pregnancy in a more general way. Id. at 566 n.1.
18. Id.
19. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1467 (E.D. Mo. 1985), rev'd, 795
F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).




hig that school officials, in the creation and subsequent handling of Spectrum,
had not created a public forum; therefore, the Court applied a less exacting first
amendment review standard.2 1 Writing for the majority, Justice White con-
cluded that school-sponsored publications and other expressive activities can be
regulated in any way "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."
22
The Court concluded that Reynolds' concerns with privacy and topic sensitivity
were legitimate and that his decision to delete two pages from the May 13 issue
of Spectrum was "reasonable under the circumstances as he understood
them."
2 3
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, dissented, urg-
ing scrutiny of all restrictions on student speech under the standards announced
in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District24 nineteen
years earlier.2 5 Justice Brennan contended that under Tinker the school consti-
tutionally could refuse to publish inadequately researched, poorly written, or
otherwise below-standard student articles because such journalism would mate-
rially disrupt the newspaper's curricular purpose. 26 A less exacting standard, in
his view, would invite school officials to seize upon any pretext to exercise bla-
tant viewpoint discrimination. 27 Justice Brennan chose to base his dissent on
broad philosophical grounds and did not address the majority's forum analysis.
Consideration of the significance of school sponsorship in Kuhlmeier must
begin with earlier cases recognizing students' broad first amendment rights. In
Tinker the Supreme Court held that students have first amendment rights, lim-
ited only by the "special characteristics of the school environment. '28 Three
students had received suspensions for wearing black armbands to school in pro-
test of the Vietnam War.29 Concluding that this expression was constitutionally
protected,30 the Court noted that "mere desire to avoid the discomfort and un-
pleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint" was not enough
to justify punishment or prohibition of student expression. 3 1 Speech that would
fall within the ambit of the first amendment outside the school environment
21. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 569. For a discussion of the Court's forum analysis, see infra notes
82-85 and accompanying text.
22. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 571.
23. Id. at 572.
24. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
25. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 576 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Tinker, see infra
notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
26. Kuhlrneier, 108 S. Ct. at 576-77 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenters apparently would
have permitted Principal Reynolds to exercise prepublication review and to insist that the articles
meet responsible journalistic standards. Id. at 576 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 577-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan found possible viewpoint discrimi-
nation in the principal's objection to the teen pregnancy story because it was an inappropriate topic.
Id. at 578-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Noting that the principal testified to his approval of another
article on the same page also concerning teenage pregnancy, Justice Brennan hypothesized that the
objectionable article may have been censored not because of its topic, but because the principal read
it as advocating irresponsible sex. Id. at 579 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
28. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
29. Id. at 504.
30. Id. at 514.
31. Id. at 509. The Court, in prohibiting schools from compelling a flag salute, has spoken
eloquently about the importance of tolerating all viewpoints, unpopular and otherwise, in the public
1989]
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cannot be punished unless it "materially disrupts classwork or involves substan-
tial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.",32 Similarly, schools cannot
prohibit speech unless they reasonably can "forecast substantial disruption of or
material interference with school activities."
' 3 3
In subsequent decisions, the Court strictly interpreted the Tinker standards
and applied them to any official attempt to punish or prohibit student expres-
sion. In Healy v. James34 a state-supported college denied official recognition to
students seeking to establish a local chapter of the Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS). 35 The Court held that denying recognition was a prior restraint
violating the freedom of association implicit in the first amendment.36 Such a
restraint was impermissible if based solely on the school's disagreement with the
policies and practices of the national organization.3 7 The Court inferred such
viewpoint discrimination because the college had not produced substantial evi-
dence that a local chapter of SDS would be a disruptive force on campus.38
Quoting Tinker, the Court stated that nonrecognition based on the college's fear
that SDS would be a disruptive influence "constituted little more than the sort of
'undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance which is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression.' ,,39
Relying on Healy and Tinker, the Court determined in Papish v. Board of
Curators4° that a student could not be expelled for distributing an indecent but
not legally obscene publication on a college campus.41 The university did not
attempt to justify the punishment of expulsion under the Tinker standards of
schools. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637-42 (1943). Writing the
Court's opinion in Barnette, Justice Jackson stated:
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen against the
State itself and all of its creatures-Boards of Education not excepted....
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other mat-
ters of opinion .... If there are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not
now occur to us.
Id. at 637, 642.
32. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
33. Id. at 514. "[tJ]ndifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to over-
come the right to freedom of expression." Id. at 508.
34. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
35. Id. at 170.
36. Id. at 181. For a discussion of the prior restraint doctrine, see infra notes 71-74 and accom-
panying text.
37. Healy, 408 U.S. at 187. Much of the dispute between the litigants centered on the affiliation
of the local group with the national SDS, some chapters of which were perceived as engaging in
violence. Id. at 185. The Court stated that such affiliation was irrelevant unless the college could
show that the local chapter had a "specific intent to further... illegal aims." Id. at 186.
38. Id. at 190-91. The only evidence the college offered on the issue of disruptiveness other
than the group's affiliation with the national SDS was the ambiguous statements of group representa-
tives regarding their potential response to issues of violence. Id.
39. Id. at 191 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
40. 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (per curiam).
41. Id. at 670. The student had a permit to sell the newspaper, the Free Press Underground, on
campus. Id. at 667. The issue asserted to be indecent contained a cartoon depicting policemen rap-




substantial disruption or invasion of the rights of others.42 In the absence of
such justification, the Court held that any punishment based on the content of
the newspaper was impermissible, because the "First Amendment leaves no
room for the operation of a dual standard in the academic community with re-
spect to the content of speech .... -43 Federal courts also have applied the
Tinker standards to distribution of underground publications by high school
students.44
Nine years after Papish, in Board of Education v. Pico,45 the Court gave the
first indication that school-imposed restrictions on expression might escape con-
stitutional scrutiny under Tinker standards when the school itself is the conduit
of that expression. At issue was the school board's removal from library shelves
of nine books that it characterized as "anti-American, anti-Christian, anti-Se-
mitic, and just plain filthy."46 Five justices voted to reverse the summary judg-
ment because a factual issue-the reasons for the removal of books-remained
undetermined. 47 Seven justices wrote opinions, however, producing no binding
holding on constitutionally permissible reasons for removal of books.48 In a
portion of his plurality opinion joined by only two justices, Justice Brennan at-
tempted to establish constitutional safeguards even broader than Tinker by vest-
ing students with a right to receive ideas. 49 Chief Justice Burger strongly
rejected any such right in a dissent that foreshadowed the Court's stance in
Kuhlmeier.50 Distinguishing the suppression in Pico from the restraint on stu-
42. Id. at 670 n.6. The university contended only that the newspaper contained speech that was
improper for the university campus. Id.
43. Id. at 671.
44. See, eg., Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972). In Shan-
ley five students were suspended for distributing, off school property and outside of school hours, an
underground newspaper characterized as "probably one of the most vanilla-flavored ever to reach a
federal court." Id. at 964. The students ran afoul of a school board policy requiring the principal's
approval before students could distribute any kind of documents. Id. at 964-65. Concluding that
regulations requiring prior approval of printed materials were not unconstitutional per se, the court
stated such prescreening could not be used to "stifle the content" of any publication other than those
that met the Tinker test of substantial disruption. Id. at 969-70. The activity for which the five
students were punished did not approach that threshold. Id. at 970; see also Fujishima v. Board of
Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1357-58 (7th Cir. 1972) (school policy interpreted as requiring principal ap-
proval of content of distributed materials constitutionally invalid); Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54,
59-60 (4th Cir. 1971) (school regulation prohibiting distribution of unapproved written material
facially invalid for failure to specify criteria for disapproval); Leibner v. Sharbaugh, 429 F. Supp.
744, 748 (E.D. Va. 1977) (regulation allowing principal to prohibit distribution of material not con-
forming to "journalistic standards of accuracy, taste, and decency" unconstitutionally vague).
45. 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion).
46. Id. at 857.
47. Id. at 875 (plurality opinion by Brennan, J.); id. at 882 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment); id. at 883 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
48. See id. at 886 n.2 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger noted, however, that all
nine justices agreed that the school board could remove books that were "pervasively vulgar" or
"educationally unsuitable." Id. at 890 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
49. Id. at 867.
50. Id. at 888 (Burger, CJ., dissenting). Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor joined in
the Chief Justice's dissenting opinion. Justice Blackmun also rejected, although in milder terms, any
absolute right to receive ideas. Id. at 880-81 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Under Justice Blackmun's formulation, a school may not purposefully suppress ideas,
but it may pursue positive educational action that has an incidental suppressive effect. Id. at 881-82
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
19891
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dent-initiated expression addressed in Tinker, the Chief Justice concluded that
"[lt does not follow... that a school board must affirmatively aid the speaker in
his communication." 51
The Court raised further questions about the general applicability of Tinker
standards in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser.52 Writing for the majority,
Chief Justice Burger made clear that a school can punish a student for lewd and
indecent forms of expression in the classroom or school assembly.53 The student
in Fraser delivered a speech nominating a fellow student for elective office dur-
ing a school-sponsored assembly.54 The speech consisted of an elaborate sexual
metaphor delivered to an audience of 600 students, many of them fourteen-year-
olds, who were required either to attend the assembly or to report to study
hall.55 The Court distinguished the protest armbands in Tinker as a "passive
expression of a political viewpoint" that did not intrude upon the work of the
school.56 The student's speech at the assembly, however, interfered with the
school's function as an inculcator of fundamental values, such as decency and
consideration for the sensibilities of others.57 Chief Justice Burger wrote:
Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the states from insisting that cer-
tain modes of expression are inappropriate and subject to sanctions.
The inculcation of these values is truly the "work of the schools." The
determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school
assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.5 8
Clearly Tinker's standards of substantial disruption and invasion of the rights of
others were not the only constitutionally valid reasons for a school to punish
student expression when that expression interfered with "the school's basic edu-
cational mission."'5 9
Tinker and its progeny analyzed students' first amendment rights in terms
of the form and content of the speech. In justifying its departure from Tinker,
the Kuhlmeier Court relied on another line of cases that based first amendment
protections on the context of the speech. The leading case in this line is Perry
Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association,6° in which a collec-
tive bargaining agreement between the school board and its teachers' bargaining
representative reserved for that union exclusive access to the interschool mail
system.61 A rival union claimed that this restriction on access infringed on its
free speech and equal protection rights.62 The Court first identified three cate-
gories of forums that determine which first amendment standard applies: the
51. Id. at 887 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
52. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
53. Id. at 685.
54. Id. at 677.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 680.
57. Id. at 681.
58. Id. at 683 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
59. Id. at 685.
60. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).




traditional public forum, 63 such as streets and parks; the limited public forum,64
which the government has opened for indiscriminate use by the public or some
segment of the public; and the nonpublic forum, 65 which may contain expression
but which has been reserved for government purposes.6 6 The government can
restrict speech only within narrow limits in the traditional and limited public
forums but can control its nonpublic forum in any reasonable manner. 67 Despite
the rival union's previous free access to the mail system and community groups'
periodic access to teacher mailfiles at individual schools, the Court held that the
school had not created a public forum because it had reserved the mail system
for school-related business.
68
Perry addressed the access of outsiders to a school forum, but did not con-
sider how courts should categorize a school-created forum for student expres-
sion. Fraser did not announce a range of constitutionally permissible reasons for
a school to punish or prohibit student expression not reachable under Tinker,
and failed to delimit the context within which the broader censorship powers
could be exercised. 69 Kuhimeier addressed all of these issues. According to the
Court, when the student expression occurs in a school-sponsored activity,
schools can exercise control over content for any valid educational purpose.
70
Kuhlmeier's significance lies in its grant to school officials of a license to
exercise prior restraint on student speech. The Court long ago determined that
the free speech and free press guarantees primarily prevented prior restraints.
7 1
63. Rg., Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (streets and other
public places).
64. Eg., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981) (university meeting rooms as public
forum limited to student groups).
65. Kg., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (char-
ity drive aimed at federal employees).
66. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.46. In Cornelius the Court refined the test for whether the govern-
ment has created a limited public forum, holding that the government must show a clear intent to
create a public forum, and courts should look to the policy and practice of access to the forum to
determine this intent. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. If the governmental purpose of the forum conflicts
with unlimited speech, or if the government makes a practice of selective access, it shows its intent to
reserve the forum as its own. Id.
67. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. "Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to
make distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter or speaker identity," so long as the distinc-
tions are reasonable in light of the purpose the forum serves. Id. at 49.
68. Id. at 47-48. Because the rival union had no first amendment right to use the mail system,
the incidental effect of the access policy, discouraging the viewpoint of the rival union while advanc-
ing that of the recognized union, presented no equal protection infirmities. Id. at 55.
69. The Fraser Court did not cite Perry and did not categorize the school assembly as a particu-
lar type of forum. The court of appeals, however, identified the assembly as a limited public forum.
Fraser v. Bethel School Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1365 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. 675
(1986). Justice Brennan points out this anomaly in his dissent in Kuhlneier, stating that the Fraser
Court faithfully applied the Tinker standard. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 575-76 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). The Kuhlmeier majority disputes this conclusion, implying that the school's power to punish
the speaker in Fraser derived from the assembly's character as a nonpublic forum. Id. at 570 n.4.
70. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 571.
71. Near v. Minnesota ex rel Olson County Attorney, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931); Patterson v.
Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). A more recent explanation of the prohibition against prior
restraints appears in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975). Writing
for the majority, Justice Blackmun stated:
[A] free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the
law than to throttle them and all others beforehand. It is always difficult to know in ad-
19891
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
At the heart of this doctrine is the view that the truth of any idea can be deter-
mined only in the marketplace of competing ideas. 72 The government can im-
pose prior restraints only in exceptional circumstances, 73 and it bears the heavy
burden, both substantively and procedurally, of justifying any such restric-
tions.74 The Kuhlmeier Court did not abandon the prior restraint doctrine. In-
stead, the Court clearly regards restrictions on student speech in school-
sponsored activities as self-restraint.
Kuhlmeier provides school officials with a three-step analysis by which they
can discern the limits on their authority to exercise this self-restraint over stu-
dent speech. First, school officials must characterize the school's role in connec-
tion with the forum: Is the school the sponsor of the expressive activity?
7 5
Second, school officials must consider whether they intentionally have opened
the forum for indiscriminate use by the students or the public. 76 Finally, if the
forum remains nonpublic, school officials must determine whether the regulation
is "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."
'77
School officials should have no difficulty determining whether they are the
sponsors of the speech they desire to suppress. The Kuhlmeier Court empha-
sized Spectrum's role as an integral part of Hazelwood East's journalism curric-
ulum. 78 A few lower courts had distinguished curricular publications and
activities from extracurricular endeavors, giving school officials broad latitude to
control content in the former but applying Tinker standards to the latter.79 The
Kuhlmeier Court does not limit its holding to purely curricular activities, how-
ever; the authority to regulate student speech applies to "school-sponsored pub-
vance what an individual will say, and the line between legitimate and illegitimate speech is
often so finely drawn that the risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable.
Id.
72. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe best test
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market .... ").
73. Near, 283 U.S. at 716 (statute allowing prior restraint on publication that lodges charges of
official misconduct unconstitutional; defamed officials' only remedy is a tort action).
74. Southeastern Promotions, 420 U.S. at 560 (denial of use of city auditorium to promoters of
rock musical "Hair" without prompt judicial review lacked requisite procedural safeguards); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam) (government failed to carry
burden of proving compelling national security interest justifying prior restraint on publication of
the Pentagon Papers).
75. Kuhlmeler, 108 S. Ct. at 569-70.
76. Id. at 567.
77. Id. at 571.
78. Id. at 568. The Court noted that Spectrum was the product of Hazelwood East's Journal-
ism II class, which was taught by a faculty member during regular class hours. Id. Students re-
ceived grades and academic credit for participation in the course. Id. The teacher selected editors,
assigned story ideas, edited stories, and dealt with the printer on all details of publication. Id.
79. See Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 216 (3rd Cir. 1981); Gambino v. Fairfax County
School Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 736 (E.D. Va.), aff'd per curiam, 564 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1977);
Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F. Supp. 1329, 1337 (D. Mass. 1970). But see Nicholson v. Board of
Educ. Torrance Unified School Dist., 682 F.2d 858, 863 n.3 (9th Cir. 1982); Reineke v. Cobb County
School Dist., 484 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 (N.D. Ga. 1980); Bayer v. Kinzler, 383 F. Supp. 1164, 1166
(E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd without opinion, 515 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1975); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp.
102, 104-05 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See generally Comment, Freedom of Expression in Public Schools:
Regulation of Student Newspapers and Other Publications, 18 CUMB. L. REV. 181, 194 (1987) (not-
ing difficulty of distinguishing curricular from extracurricular activities and offering factors to con-
sider); Note, supra note 6, at 633 (Tinker applies to both curricular and extracurricular activities).
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lications, theatrical productions and other expressive activities that students,
parents and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the impri-
matur of the school." s0 Whenever the school lends its name and resources to an
activity, it needs the authority to ensure that students learn the intended lessons
and that the public does not mistakenly attribute student views to the school.
8'
If the school sponsors an expressive activity, the activity's status as a non-
public forum is nearly a foregone conclusion. The Kuhlmeier Court emphasized
that schools create public forums only if they intentionally open the activity for
indiscriminate use by the public, students, or student groups.82 A statement pub-
lished at the beginning of the school year, that Spectrum accepts all first amend-
ment rights, was deemed insufficient evidence of an intent to designate the
newspaper a public forum.83 The Court also rejected the argument that because
the students exercised some editorial control over Spectrum's contents, the
school had intentionally opened Spectrum as a public forum. 84 Instead, the
Court viewed the faculty advisor's supervisory duties and the principal's prepub-
lication review as conclusive indications of the school's intent to reserve Spec-
trum for educational purposes.85 Under the Kuhimeier forum analysis, nothing
short of a school-sponsored rap session, inviting students to speak openly about
their concerns, would constitute a limited public forum for student speech.
The weakness in the Court's analysis is its view that the concepts of reserv-
ing an activity for educational purposes and creating a forum for students to
share their ideas and opinions are mutually exclusive.8 6 The Court in Tinker
80. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 569. The Court did not acknowledge the curricular- extracurricu-
lar distinction. Irrespective of whether activities occur outside the traditional classroom, if they "are
supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student
participants and audiences" the activities fall within the Court's definition of curriculum. Id. at 570.
The Court, then, would characterize as curricular such traditionally extracurricular groups as the
cheerleading squad and the school's chapter of Future Farmers of America.
81. Id. at 570.
82. Id. at 568. In previous forum analyses, the Court has examined intent by inquiring, in part,
whether the speaker seeking access to a forum has adequate alternative channels of expression. See
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 809 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1983). In Perry, the Court held that the
school's reservation of its mail system as a nonpublic forum was reasonable because there were
ample alternative means of communication. Id. For a discussion of the Court's decision in Perry,
see supra text accompanying notes 60-68.
The Kuhimeier Court did not raise the alternative channels issue. One commentator concluded,
however, that because students have no equivalent means of communicating with each other, schools
presumably intend that student newspapers be public forums. Note, Public Forum Analysis and
State Owned Publications: Beyond Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School District, 55 FORDHAM L. REV.
241, 258 (1986).
83. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 569.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 568-69.
86. Lower courts evaluating educational activities that also provided venues for student expres-
sion have determined that students' first amendment rights take precedence over the school's interest
in controlling content. To reach these results, the courts usually have denominated the activity an
open forum. See Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570, 575 (5th Cir.) (university literary magazine),
aff'd per curiam as modified on rehearing en banc, 489 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1973), cerL denied, 416
U.S. 995 (1974); Stanton v. Brunswick School Dep't, 577 F. Supp. 1560, 1570 (D. Me. 1984) (high-
school yearbook); see also Buckley, Student Publications, the First Amendment, and State Speech, 34
CLEV. ST. L. REv. 267, 270-86 (1985) (forum analysis unworkable when state is publisher; student
publications, as government speech, should be protected from intergovernmental censorship).
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had observed:
The principal use to which the schools are dedicated is to accommo-
date students during prescribed hours for the purpose of certain types
of activities. Among those activities is personal intercommunication
among the students. This is not only an inevitable part of the process
of attending school; it is also an important part of the educational
process.
87
The court of appeals concluded that Spectrum "was a public forum in which the
school encouraged students to express their views to the entire student body
freely, and [that] students commonly did so." s Spectrum published stories of
interest to students, including school news, current affairs, and letters to the
editor.8 9 Students not enrolled in the Journalism II class could also submit sto-
ries for publication. 90 The school clearly intended Spectrum to serve two pur-
poses: to provide a forum for student expression, and to provide an educational
opportunity for Journalism II students. In the Kuhimeier Court's view, how-
ever, because the school intended Spectrum to serve the latter purpose, the for-
mer purpose was irrelevant, and the newspaper remained a nonpublic forum
with few first amendment protections. To maintain substantial control over con-
tent, therefore, schools need only refrain from unequivocally throwing open
their forums for the school community's unchecked use.
The Tinker standards for regulating student speech remain applicable,
however, to those few public forums a school may create.9 1 Student-initiated
expression that the school does not sponsor, such as underground newspapers or
protest symbols, also remains within Tinker's protection. Educators' ability to
silence a student's personal expression occurring on the school premises contin-
ues to depend on whether that expression would constitute a substantial disrup-
tion or invade the rights of others.9 2
The school publisher's powers are not unlimited, however, even in a school-
sponsored, nonpublic forum; the regulation must have a valid educational pur-
pose. 93 The Kuhlmeier Court outlined a broad range of justifications for regu-
lating student speech in school-sponsored activities that would be reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.94 The school can refuse to promote
87. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512.
88. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1373 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S.
Ct. 562 (1988).
89. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 607 F. Supp. 1450, 1452-53 (E.D. Mo. 1985), rev'd,
795 F.2d 1368 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
90. Id. at 1453.
91. See Kuhlmeler, 108 S. Ct. at 569. For an example of one such forum, see supra text follow-
ing note 85.
92. id. at 569 n.2.
93. Id. at 571.
94. Id. The "legitimate pedagogical concerns" test is equivalent to the rational-basis test that
the Court has applied in certain due-process contexts. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943). In that case, however, the Court stated that "freedoms of speech
and of press... may not be infringed on such slender grounds." Id. at 639. But see Diamond, The
First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judicial Intervention, 59 TEx. L. REv. 477,
528 (1981) (courts should use minimum rationality standard to review all first amendment claims
arising in public schools).
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speech that is grammatically incorrect, inadequately researched, biased, or vul-
gar.95 Additionally, the school can restrain student speech that it judges inap-
propriate for the emotional maturity of the intended audience,96 or that tends to
advocate drug or alcohol use, teenage sexual activity, or other improper con-
duct.97 Finally, a school can refuse to promote speech that might associate it
"with any position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy."' 98
Indeed, the permissible reasons for a school to refuse to promote student speech
give principals power virtually equivalent to that of a private publisher.99
When considering whether the school's reason for censorship is a legitimate
pedagogical concern, courts must pay great deference to the decisions of educa-
tors. 1°° "ITIhe education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of
parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal
judges."' 1 1 Nevertheless, under Tinker, school officials bore the burden of prov-
ing that their decision to punish or prohibit student speech was justified because
of the possibility of substantial disruption or the invasion of the rights of
others.10 2 Kuhlmeier shifts to students the burden of proving that the restraint
on speech served no valid pedagogical purpose.' 0 3 This burden promises to
prove virtually insurmountable;1°4 if school officials were ever bold enough to
admit they censored speech solely because they disagreed with its viewpoint, the
Court would refuse to allow the restraint.105 If the viewpoint discrimination can
95. Kuhlmeler, 108 S. Ct. at 570.
96. Id. Such sensitive topics "might range from the existence of Santa Claus in an elementary
school setting to the particulars of teenage sexual activity in a high school setting." Id. Justice
Brennan was particularly critical of this justification, calling it a "vaporous nonstandard... that
invites manipulation to achieve ends that cannot permissibly be achieved through blatant viewpoint
discrimination." Id. at 578 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 570; see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) ("The importance of public
schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the
values on which our society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions.")
98. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 570. Since the views in a student newspaper may be "erroneously
attributed to the school," id., it is arguable that this justification may give schools a blanket editorial
license to prohibit any student expression on controversial political issues.
99. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,258 (1974) (publisher's powers
include determining what goes into the paper and how public officials and issues will'be treated).
100. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 571. The Court frequently has referred to the deference courts
must pay to curricular decisions of states and their schools. See, eg., Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176, 208 (1982) (determination of appropriate methodology for educating the handicapped rests
with state); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975) (evidence to be considered in student
disciplinary proceedings lies within discretion of school administrators). The Court has interfered,
however, with determinations of educational policy that conflict with fundamental first amendment
values. See, eg., Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2577 (1987) (invalidating Louisiana statute
requiring teaching of creation science whenever evolution theory is taught); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923) (invalidating Nebraska ban on teaching of foreign languages).
101. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 571.
102. Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 969 (5th Cir. 1972).
103. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 571.
104. Courts require that the state's articulated purpose be sincere and not a sham. Edwards v.
Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573, 2579 (1987). Given the broad outlines of legitimate pedagogical concerns
sketched by the Court, however, it is hard to imagine any speech about which a school could not
state a facially legitimate justification for censorship.
105. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (control
over subject matter in a nonpublic forum must be viewpoint neutral). In its brief, the school con-
ceded that it must exercise censorship in a manner that is viewpoint neutral. Brief for Petitioners at
32, Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988) (No. 86-836).
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be considered incidental to a proper purpose, however, Kuhlmeier counsels fed-
eral judges not to interfere.10 6 Given this judicial deference, virtually any justifi-
cation the school offers for restricting student speech will fall within
constitutional bounds.
Once the school establishes this minimal justification for regulating student
speech, its authority is unlimited; the Court imposes no constitutional require-
ment that schools restrain speech in the least restrictive manner possible. Courts
have recognized this requirement when school officials justifiably prohibit stu-
dent-initiated speech based on Tinker standards. 10 7 More generally, the
Supreme Court has insisted that states employ the least drastic means of re-
straint any time a legitimate government regulation also stifles fundamental per-
sonal liberties.10 8 The Court's characterization of Principal Reynolds' decision
to delete two pages as "reasonable under the circumstances as he understood
them" 10 9 illustrates that school officials are not obligated to find the least restric-
tive means to censor speech in school-sponsored activities. Reynolds' belief that
there was no time to make necessary changes in the articles was reasonable, in
the Court's view, even though he did not inquire whether printing could be
delayed until the problems in the stories were corrected. 10
In a footnote, the Kuhimeier majority hypothesized that many schools
might discontinue student publications rather than control them within Tinker's
limits, which it viewed as requiring publication "regardless of how sexually ex-
plicit, racially intemperate, or personally insulting that expression otherwise
might be." 1 1' Accepting this as a realistic possibility1 2 and conceding, argu-
106. In view of the Court's analysis in Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37 (1983), students would have no better success challenging such incidental viewpoint discrim-
ination on equal protection grounds. See supra note 68. "[Oin government property that has not
been made a public forum, not all speech is equally situated, and the State may draw distinctions
which relate to the special purpose for which the property is used." Perry, 460 U.S. at 55.
107. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d. 1368, 1374 n.5 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Of
course, if student writings are to be censored prior to publication, the least restrictive means are to be
followed."), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988).
108. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980) (order
prohibiting inclusion of inserts discussing controversial issues in monthly utility bills unconstitu-
tional because it is not narrowly drawn to serve compelling state interest); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 488-89 (1960) (statute requiring teachers to disclose all associational ties unconstitutional
because of overbreadth).
109. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 572.
110. Id. The Court noted that the faculty member responsible for Spectrum had recently been
replaced and may not have been entirely familiar with production procedures. Id. Reynolds felt
"pressure... to make an immediate decision so that students would not be deprived of the newspa-
per altogether." Id. The court of appeals took a markedly different view of the reasonableness of the
decision to delete two pages, characterizing it as mere administrative convenience. "It is clear from
the record that there was no specific timetable for publication ..., thus the principal could have
delayed publication long enough to seek student concurrence to the changes he proposed."
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1375 (8th Cir. 1986), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 562
(1988). Justice Brennan was more blunt: "Where '[t]he separation of legitimate from illegitimate
speech calls for more sensitive tools,' the principal used a paper shredder." Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at
580 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525
(1958)).
111. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 572 n.9.
112. The Court did not provide any statistics about the number of schools that had dissolved
student publications during the 19 years Tinker was presumed to be the standard for school regula-
tion of all student speech. Noteworthy in this regard is Justice Black's dissent in Tinker, which
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endo, that Tinker gave school officials insufficient control of their educational
endeavors, the Court nevertheless overreacts. Principals now have the
equivalent of "a general warrant to act as 'thought police' stifling discussion of
all but state-approved topics and advocacy of all but the official position."
113
A forum analysis that takes a more realistic view of the school's purposes in
sponsoring expressive activities holds promise for case-by-case results that
would better safeguard students' needs and rights to express their views. If a
publication is truly a journalistic laboratory, 114 then perhaps school officials
should have a free hand to control content. By contrast, an extracurricular
newspaper published under the school's auspices but produced with students'
voluntary creative efforts deserves more sensitive first amendment protections.
A newspaper like Spectrum, as a hybrid of the two, would pose more difficulties.
Nonetheless, under this test, the Kuhlmeier case probably would have come out
the same based on the Court's interpretation of the facts. 1 5 Such an approach
would provide students involved in purely extracurricular activities with a "civ-
ics lesson" in first amendment values' 1 6 and give substance to the Court's asser-
tion that "[tihe vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more
vital than in the community of American schools."
' "17
Instead, the Court has placed the censor's scissors squarely in the hands of
school officials any time they act as publishers of student expression, and federal
courts will intervene only when the silenced student can show the restraint was
without a valid educational purpose." 8 This ruling creates a great risk that
school officials will take up the scissors too often, motivated by their natural
desire to maintain a bright image for their schools. Principals and other school
authorities have an "urgent wish to avoid... controversy"' 1 9 that could in any
way earn the disfavor of parents, upon whom the schools depend for support, in
terms of tax dollars, volunteerism, and general good will. Under the Court's lax
standard of legitimate pedagogical concerns, officials can invoke almost any pre-
text to censor student expression. A likely target for censorship will be criticism
of the school itself.120 If controversy and criticism are eliminated from the
school-sponsored modes of expression, then students will have lost their most
effective means of sharing ideas and attitudes.
predicted such dire consequences as students' defyifig their teachers and thinking that among their
first amendment rights was the right to control the schools. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 525 (Black, J.,
dissenting). After analyzing empirical data, one commentator concluded those predictions had not
materialized. Comment, Tinker's Legacy: Freedom of the Press in Public High Schools, 28 DE PAUL
L. REV. 387, 419 (1979).
113. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 577 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
114. Justice White quoted the Hazelwood East Curriculum Guide, which called the Journalism
II class that produced Spectrum a laboratory situation in which the students publish the school
newspaper applying skills they have learned in Journalism I. Id. at 568.
115. See supra note 78.
116. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 573 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
118. Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. at 571.
119. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510.
120. Note, supra note 6, at 651 C"Mhe officials who will be reviewing student expression are
likely also to be the targets of that expression, making objective evaluation difficult.").
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Schools certainly have a right and a duty to control curriculum and student
conduct for educational value and propriety. However, "the purpose of educa-
tion is to spread, not to stifle, ideas and views."1 2 1 The Kuhimeier Court has
created a risk that school officials will don the broad mantle of publisher to
"eliminate all diversity of thought, ... 'strangle the free mind at its source and
teach youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes.' 122
DINITA L. JAMES
121. Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 972 (5th Cir. 1972) ("Ideas in their
pure and pristine form, touching only the minds and hearts of school children, must be freed from
despotic dispensation by all men, be they robed as academicians or judges or citizen members of a
board of education.").
122. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 879 (1982) (quoting West Virginia State Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
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